[BLANK AUDIO] Our history is the history of the peoples of the Mediterranean, of the civilisations and cultures that emerged, grew and interacted with one another. They have given and received, lent and borrowed, and one of the channels of these exchanges, as paradoxical as it may seem, is violence, even to the point where one can speak of violence as the basis of Mediterranean relations. Because of the existence, since the end of the 15th century, of a clear political and religious division in the Mediterranean, it might be tempting to interpret modern history as the clash of civilisations, as the split between Islam and Christianity. But make no mistake, it is the modern states that have clashed with one another, at times under the banner of religion, at other times in a quest for improved well-being, and at yet others for the purpose of mere survival. So we talk about wars, states and princes, and not about civilisations. And beyond that, societies were changing dramatically, both through internal processes of evolution, and through drastic differences in development that were taking place along the shores of the Mediterranean. >> As Manuel Rivero explains, shortly after becoming Pope Pius II, Enea Silvio Bartolomeo Piccolomini convened the Council of Mantua of 1459 to discuss with the Christian princes the organisation of a great crusade to liberate Constantinople. None of the invitees attended, although all had declared their willingness to give their lives and kingdoms for the victory of God. All of the examples we find of these kind of initiatives end in the same way. Nevertheless, the discourse of the crusades continued to have an indisputable attraction for the Catholic world, and even for the Protestant world, an anachronism in the Modern Age. In fact, invoking the crusade provided Rome with one of the few grounds for claiming its leading role in the Catholic world. The image of lay princes fighting Islam under the guiding hand of the Church was as attractive as it was impossible, but it was constantly invoked also by the kings, who did nothing to make it happen. Ferdinand the Catholic denounced the Neapolitan kings� dealings with the Turks to take the Neapolitan throne. For Charles V the idea of uniting Christianity against the infidels helped to stigmatise Francis I of France when he signed an alliance against the Ottomans in 1535. Even more importantly, the papal bull of the Holy Crusade provided more income for the strained coffers of the Hispanic monarchy. Therefore, it was a discourse meant primarily for internal ideological consumption that was never intended to be implemented despite the partial Holy Leagues that were forming. Nor was there ever a real ideological battle for conversion on the other side. It served only to create a distorted, simplistic and hostile idea of a permanent enemy: Islam. A similar development took place later in the Ottoman Empire. The Islamic discourse appears in the middle of the 16th century. Mehmet II and Suleiman the Magnificent tried to assume the Byzantine imperial tradition, which meant that they could not present themselves only as caliphs of the Muslim world and maintained a certain eclecticism in terms of their political positions towards Christianity. But, if the Christian world was plural, their world was as well. Egypt maintained its independence until 1517, and Maghreb was recognised as the vassal of the Sublime Porte, but not under its direct control. The eastern borders, the existence of Shiite Persia, forced them to maintain a cautious religious attitude. And inside the empire there was considerable discontent among the Sunni Arabs about being ruled by the foreign Turks. To unite the whole, invoking war against the infidel and the creation of an enemy depicted in a negative light was combined with assuming the title of caliph, the prince of the believers, by the Ottoman sovereigns. So, if we don�t want to reduce the complexity of the modern Mediterranean world to the study of the relationships between Christians and Muslims, in addition to these interactions, we have to consider the internal evolution of its societies and states. Although it was not the only sailing vessel of the time, the galley was the quintessential ship of the Mediterranean. With almost no keel, it was unsafe in choppy waters, but this was compensated by its speed and its ability to perform complex manoeuvres in the water. It was perfectly suited to the waters in which it sailed, and it had the same effect in economic terms and for mobilising resources as ocean-going caravels and galleons, and were even better in terms of the use of people, if we consider galiots, which were propelled by human effort. When they were underway, they were vulnerable, if the weather turned foul, neither the sails nor the oars could steer them. But with perfect weather conditions, a galley with artillery could be a formidable enemy in naval combat. Over the course of the Modern Age, galleys increased in size and firepower. At the end of the 15th century, Christian galleys loaded artillery on platforms on the bow and stern. The number and calibre of these increased to 18 cannons just a half century later. The reason for this change was the Ottoman invasion. At the beginning of the 16th century they had reached their outer limits, with the conquest of Egypt Barbarossa put the Maghreb coast under his control. War became endemic in the entire Mediterranean, which led to a naval build-up that culminated in the in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. There were larger vessels, in larger fleets, but not necessarily an increase in naval battles. In general, they tried to avoid large-scale confrontations. Andrea Doria was a member of a prosperous Genoese family who were involved in the business of building a large fleet of warships, which made him a major condottiero in the service of France until he changed sides and joined the Spanish, a decision that would affect history, both of the monarchy and of Genoa, for over a century. He put his fleet at the service of Emperor Charles V in exchange for money. He was not alone, most of the admirals were also the owners of the galleys they fought with. On 28 September 1538, the allied fleets of the Pope, Venice and the Empire, led by Doria himself, withdrew after a day of combat with Barbarossa�s fleet in Venetian waters, despite requests from the papal and Venetian captains to continue the battle. Although in the first hours the Christian fleet was being defeated, the Venetians did not hesitate to accuse the Genoese admiral of avoiding conflict. True or not, Ulu� Ali, the bey of Algiers, who reinforced the Ottoman fleet that fought in Lepanto with 100 galleys was accused of withdrawing when he foresaw disaster. One thing that naval battles teach us, regardless of the reliability of some admirals, is that no war is won at sea. On the water, a victory doesn�t mean new territory is occupied, nor great tactical or strategic advantages achieved. The defeats of the Christians in Preveza and Djerba did not allow the Ottomans to dominate the Mediterranean beyond their terrestrial borders. And the victory in Lepanto in 1571 also did nothing to stop a powerful Turkish fleet from again sailing the sea 7 months later. Was it worth risking the sacrifice expert sailors and ships for the questionable advantages of victory? The real battle was taking place on land. It was about controlling ports and strategic passes, and protecting territories and subjects from enemy threats. The truly decisive blows were the occupations of forts or islands. Barbarossa�s occupation of Algiers in 1516, the Ottoman occupation of Rhodes in 1522, the offensives of Charles V in Tunis in 1535 and Algiers in 1541 and again in 1560 were answered with attacks on Malta in 1565, Cyprus in 1570, and on Crete, which the Ottomans seized from the Venetians in late 1667. To prevent these types of conquests, the only recourse was to invest in fixed coastal defences. From the time of Charles V, and especially during the reign of Philip II, fortifications were strengthened in Rosas, Barcelona, Mallorca... Fleets protected routes and forts protected the coasts. After Lepanto, Istanbul was no longer seen as a real threat to the Christian world. In 1580, Philip II signed a treaty, which was subsequently renewed with the sultan, and in a symbolic coincidence, redirected his energies towards Portugal, towards the Atlantic. But the conflict remained. The great fleets and military objectives were gone, but now protagonism would shift to something that had always been the most common and permanent threat to the coasts, especially the Christian ones: pirating. Since the end of the 15th century, the actions of the agile north African ships had been the greatest threat to the Iberian and Italian coasts. A fleet left Algiers in 1472 and attacked the coast of Tuscany. The attack of Cullera in 1503 that devastated the population had the same origin. Despite their virulence, these attacks were not a serious threat to the safety of the whole. They were only motivated by loot and survival, and had no greater ambition. Actually, this was part of a give and take in which the Christians did their part. But a major change took place in 1516 with the arrival of Barbarossa. In only a few years they controlled the main ports of the coast, and under the leadership of Hayreddin, vassal of the Ottoman Empire, they became another force in the war against the Spanish monarchy. It was difficult to determine where and when the attacks would take place. The coasts were interspersed with watch towers like these, that would warn of sightings of potential threats, or at night using fires, they warned of the approach of suspicious boats. This ex-voto is a good example of how the population experienced a situation in which possible capture and slavery in Algiers was totally feasible, to the point that, the historian Rosella Concila talked about these conflicts as the third dimension: the world of renegades and converts. Some 300,000 people converted from Christianity to Islam in two centuries to gain freedom or fortune, beginning with the Barbarossa family itself, who were of Albanian Christian origin. And yet we could also include in this third dimension the points of contact. Friars who negotiated freeing those captured and Spanish Moors who were the accomplices of Muslim privateers who were finally expelled in 1609. Although some Dutch merchants had done this under the cover of the French, after the end of the 16th century, in 1604, the States General of the Netherlands wrote to Sultan Mahomet asking to trade with Syria. The Ottoman response took 6 years to arrive, and led to the actions culminating in 1612 with the arrival of the first ambassador to Istanbul. This was the culmination of a process of introducing the Atlantic and Protestant powers into the Mediterranean. These powers were not only not reluctant to trade with the infidels, but sought to establish diplomatic relations with the Barbary corsairs to ensure the safety of their voyages. The Mediterranean entered into a new phase in which Muslim piracy was added to the conflict between the European powers for the control of Mediterranean commerce. The English, the Dutch, and the French competed against the Venetians and the Spanish for the control of the western Mediterranean, and the benefits of trade with the east. And new wars among the Europeans reddened the water with blood in the second half of the 17th century. In 1636 rumours arrived at the government of Madrid about contact made between Charles I of England and the Morabatino of Morocco to join forces and take Ceuta. Between 1661 and 1663 the English had Tangier, but they couldn�t hold it. But this showed the English interest in controlling bases in the Strait of Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean. It wasn�t until after the War of the Spanish Succession that the British would realise their goal with their Dutch allies at their side. Gibraltar and Mallorca were under their control and would be the new arbiters of the Mediterranean. In the 18th century, the economic destiny of the Mediterranean was decided far from its shores. London, Amsterdam, Paris and Vienna were the new true owners of its future. Despite its enormous cultural vitality, the structural violence related to piracy and its glorious past, the contemporary world would complete the change that had been initiated. [BLANK AUDIO] [BLANK AUDIO]
